PROJECT TWO

AUSTRALIA: 1966-75

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V2 - 1969 2PP ALP vote
V8 - 1969-72 2PP swing

Table 2.22 is similar to both the mean table 2.3 and the equivalent 1966 table 2.16. The pro-Labor voters comprise craftsmen, transport workers, younger workers, especially young female workers, and all employees. In the case of 2.22 however these pro-Labor groups are joined by the public housing tenants who swung to Labor between 1966 and 1969.

The anti-Labor groups in table 2.22 are also similar to both the mean table 2.3 and the 1966 table 2.17, with employers and the self-employed being joined by the elderly, the better-educated (non-degree tertiary) and the wealthy (with two plus cars). The class-vote relationship appears to have been stable too between 1966 and 1969, with similar pearson correlations for the top pro-Labor (craftsmen) and anti-Labor (employers) groups. The only persons who would be surprised by this sort of result would be the Prime Minister's present academic advisers.

Table 2.23 profiles the main groups which swung towards and against Labor in 1972. The top pro-Labor swingers were those persons with higher levels of high school education, protestants, tenants of higher-cost public housing, female craftsmen and flat renters. In general females are more prominent than males among these groups which swung to Labor.

These variables outline a loose stereotype of "up-market working class" persons, with good secondary educational qualifications living in expensive rented public housing or flats, and - because of their education - earning a higher-than-the-norm wage for this stereotype.

PEARSON R TABLE

Political Variable - V2 1969 2PP

PEARSON R	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
+.67	V177 MALES - CRAFTSMEN
+.52	V137 FEMALES - WORKFORCE - 15 TO 19 YEARS
+.50	V176 MALES - TRANSPORT WORKERS
+.46	V148 PERSONS - WORKFORCE - 15 TO 19 YEARS
+.43	V 72 YUGOSLAVIAN BORN
+.42	V197 RENTED S.H.A. HOUSES
+.41	V209 HOMES TENANT S.H.A.
+.40	V126 MALES - WORKFORCE - 15 TO 19 YEARS
+.39	V162 MALES - EMPLOYEES
-.40	V173 MALES - SALES WORKERS
-.42	V186 FEMALES - FARMERS
-.44	V163 MALES - HELPERS
-.45	V118 MALES - NON-DEGREE TERTIARY
-.45	V217 HOMES WITH 2 CARS
-.45	V122 FEMALES - TECHNICIANS
-.48	V195 FEMALES - "HOME DUTIES" (PART-TIME WORKERS)
-.48	V171 MALES - ADMINISTRATIVE
-.48	V161 MALES - SELF-EMPLOYED
-.49	V147 FEMALES - WORKFORCE - 65 YEARS AND OVER
-.50	V 52 PRESBYTERIANS
-.52	V123 FEMALES - NON-DEGREE TERTIARY
-.53	V158 PERSONS - WORKFORCE - 65 YEARS AND OVER
-.54	V165 FEMALES - EMPLOYERS
-.54	V166 FEMALES - SELF-EMPLOYED
-.58	V136 MALES - WORKFORCE - 65 YEARS AND OVER
-.62	V160 MALES - EMPLOYERS

Table 2.22

PEARSON R TABLE

Political Variable - V8 2PP SWING 1969-72

PEARSON R	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
+.51	V112 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 11
+.49	V102 MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 11
+.34	V203 $ RENT S.H.A. HOUSES
+.34	V110 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 9
+.34	V 55 PROTESTANT (UNDEFINED)
+.31	V113 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 12
+.31	V189 FEMALES - CRAFTSMEN
+.31	V201 RENTED OTHER FLATS
+.30	V207 $ RENT - OTHER FLATS
-.31	V108 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 7
-.31	V126 MALES - WORKFORCE - 15 TO 19 YEARS
-.31	V137 FEMALES - WORKFORCE - 15 TO 19 YEARS
-.33	V104 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADES 1,2,3
-.34	V 98 MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 7
-.34	V148 PERSONS - WORKFORCE - 15 TO 19 YEARS
-.35	V105 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 4
-.38	V109 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 8
-.38	V 51 METHODISTS
-.38	v 99 MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 8
-.39	V 94 MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADES 1,2,3
-.42	V 49 JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES
-.43	V 95 MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 4
-.46	V 97 MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 6
-.46	V107 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 6
-.47	V106 FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 5
-.52	V 96 MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 5

Table 2.23

On the negative side, those who swung away from Labor included those parents of young workers who had swung to Labor in the preceding election, those belonging to the conservative religions of either Jehovah's Witness or Methodist, and the poorly-educated. This last factor appears to have dominated the gross anti-Labor swing. Because of this low average education for the anti-Labor swingers a corresponding stereotype would be decidedly "down-market" in terms of the quality of these persons' employment, their pay, and their perceptions of the political process.

At this stage of the discussion, it's too early for firm ideas, but it would seem that the mood of the "It's time" campaign of 1972 certainly did not extend down-market (if I can be excused the continued use of that awful term) to those persons in our society with the crummy jobs and the lower rates of pay.

The It's Time campaign however certainly appears to have succeeded among the up-market blue-collar groups in our society.

A clearer picture of these groups will emerge during discussion of the following figures and tables for this section.

The "mood nature" of the 1969-72 swing appears partly confirmed by figure 2.21. Apart from the anti-Labor swing of the parents of 15-19 year olds, lower figure 2.21 shows a reasonably-uniform swing to Labor across all age groups. Deviations from this uniformity are also interesting. The swings were in fact quite low among those 30-39 year old women, who had swung so strongly to Labor in 1969. The swings were quite high among 25-29 year olds of both sexes, 30-34 year-old men, and women aged 60 and over.



Figure 2·21

AGE

In summary, only the younger members of the 25-44 year-old swinging voter group swung to Labor in 1972, probably due to the fact that the older members of this important swinging voter group had already swung to Labor quite significantly in 1969. This trend is discussed again later in this section.

* * *

Lower figure 2.22 shows that the swings to Labor were much more pronounced across all age groups in the workforce, than the earlier swings in figure 2.21 which referred also to persons outside the workforce. There were also some interestingly-high swings to Labor from older working women.

Lower figure 2.23 is quite interesting in that it serves to "flesh out" the stereotypes alluded to above. Here we can see mild swings to Labor from upper-white collar professional and administrative workers, male craftsmen, male service workers, male members of the armed services, male "others" and female unemployed. There were significant swings to Labor from male sales workers, female craftsmen and female "others".

There were mild anti-Labor swings from the rural-based farmers and miners, and transport workers (I am ignoring the very small female miners and female armed service workers). Significant anti-Labor swings were recorded among the (poorly-educated) females employed in the sales and service sectors.

This evidence adds a little weight to the "up-market" stereotype referred to above, except that we can now include the middle-white collar groups amongst our pro-Labor swingers in 1972. Lower figure 2.24 gives us a little additional information. Here we can see Labor's increased support in 1972 came mainly from wage and salary earners, with a bias towards females. Gross movements against Labor had as a base housewives, employers and the self-employed.



Figure 2.22
AGE OF THE WORKFORCE



Figure 2.23
OCCUPATION



Figure 2-24
MAJOR ACTIVITY
QUALIFICATIONS
OCCUP. STATUS.

Figure 2.25 is probably the most interesting we have seen so far in this section. Here we can clearly see a sex-free distribution of gross swings across education groups, with large swings against Labor from all persons who had been educated to only first-year high school levels. Those educated to second year high school swung towards Labor, however Labor lost votes among the next group of voters who had sat for intermediate examinations. The swing to Labor was quite high among those voters who had studied to Leaving or Matriculation standard. These persons would tend also to be those employed in the white-collar groups described in figure 2.23.

Figure 2.26 is self-explanatory and requires no comment. Lower figure 2.26 in particular contains little of statistical or political significance.

Figure 2.27 requires little comment, except a noting of the small swing to Labor from the rural middle class group of Presbyterians.

Lower Figure 2.28 shows Labor's support continued to fall (from 1969 levels) among tenants of all rented furnished private houses, and yet continued to rise among tenants of high-rent-cost furnished private houses.

In 1972 Labor's support fell among tenants of all rented S.H.A. Houses and yet rose significantly among tenants of high-cost rented S.H.A. houses. This was the reverse of the 1969 swing situation.

Labor's support in 1972 also rose among tenants of "other flats" (non-furnished), tenants of high-cost rented other houses and tenants of high-cost other flats.



Figure 225
EDUCATION



Figure 2.26
ETHNICITY



Figure 2·27
RELIGION



Figure 2.28
HOUSING

The above results would appear to inidcate that young couples in the 25-29 age groups mentioned earlier who were waiting to obtain housing finance in 1972, could have swung to Labor in 1972 partly because of frustration at delays in obtaining housing loans. These would have been the sort of persons occupying rental housing while saving deposits for housing finance.

Lower Figure 2.29 shows home owners remained neutral in 1972, although this information does not discriminate between mortgage-free home owners and home owners who were still paying off mortgages.

Figure 2.29 also shows that houses with television sets (urban areas) were stable in 1972, following their big pro-Labor swing in 1969.

Interestingly, the swings to Labor in 1972 for various levels of car ownership were the reverse of 1969, with swings to Labor from the normally-stable group with no cars, and swings against Labor from the affluent and rural group with two-plus cars.

* * *

Regression Table 2.24 is very similar to the mean Table 2.7 with a few minor interesting variations. Firstly, we can note in the second line the positive contribution to Labor's 1969 vote from the tenants of S.H.A. houses, a group which swung heavily to Labor between 1966-69. Secondly we can see that two groups which had negative correlations with the 1969 vote - females completing school to grade 5 and male farmers - actually made positive contributions to the 1969 Labor vote. In the case of females educated to grade 5, the variance in the Labor vote explained by the preceding six variables would have been sufficient to provide a positive partial correlation by the time the computer program arrived at this variable. Male farmers was a similar case. Because the female farmers variable was thought to provide a good surrogate variable for high income farms, the inclusion of this female



Figure 2.29
HOUSING:
CARS:
TV:

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

POLITICAL VARIABLE - V2 1969 2PP

VARIABLE NUMBER	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND REGRESSION EQUATION (BELOW)	VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	EXTRA VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	SIGN OF COEFFICIENT AND CONSTANT
177	MALES - CRAFTSMEN	45.1	45.1	+
197	RENTED S.H.A. HOUSES	54.2	9.1	+
173	MALE - SALES	57.5	3.3	-
186	FEMALES - FARMERS	66.6	9.1	-
123	FEMALES - NON-DEGREE TERTIARY	69.8	3.2	-
177	DELETED	69.6	-	
209	HOMES - TENANT S.H.A.	71.5	1.9	-
106	FEMALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 5	73.2	1.7	+
200	RENTED S.H.A. FLATS	74.1	0.9	
212	FLATS - TENANT S.H.A.	75.4	1.3	-
209	DELETED	74.9	-	
148	PERSONS - WORKFORCE 15 TO 19 YEARS	75.7	0.6	+
174	MALES - FARMERS	76.6	0.9	+
162	MALES - EMPLOYEES	77.6	1.0	+
106	DELETED	77.1	-	
	CONSTANT	-	-	+
	V2 = 123 x -2.6665			
	148 x 2.4927			
	186 x -7.1655			
	197 x 0.3457			
	173 x -4.6758			
	162 x 0.3129			

174 x 0.7847
200 x 28.4250
212 x -25.2556
+47.9142
±5.6273

Table 2.24

farmers variable early in the regression equation would have left a resultant positive partial correlation between male farmers and the Labor vote. This farmer variable, it should be noted, also includes farm workers and farm labourers. This situation is similar to the earlier problem discussed about Greek-born or Greek Orthodox persons and the Labor vote. In any event, only the first seven lines of the regression equation explain a reasonably significant extra percentage of the variance. The additional explaining power of the remaining steps were pretty marginal.

* * *

Table 2.25 adds little to our present picture of the 1969-72 swing stereotype. Lines one, five, six and 11 dealing with education contribute more than 55 percent of the total explained variance and confirm that voters with low primary school education (about 15 percent of the then electorate) swung against Labor and better-educated persons especially those with Leaving, led the swing to Labor.

Occupational-class factors (all dealing with females only) contributed just under one-third of the explained variance. The younger blue-collar group of "other" workers swung towards Labor, while the white-collar sales group and the blue-collar service and craftsmen groups swung against Labor. I would conclude from this that women workers in 1972 were a good deal more volatile than their male counterparts (not one male occupation group appeared in the regression table 2.25) and that the net effect of this volatility in 1972 was minimal. A check of the data shows that the pro-Labor occupation group of females "other" was a small, young highly-mobile group, most of whom would then be living in flats. This reinforces the results in figure 2.28 which showed significant swings to Labor among flat-dwellers, and it also supports the general conclusion that

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

POLITICAL VARIABLE - V8 1969-72 SWING

VARIABLE NUMBER	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND REGRESSION EQUATION (BELOW)	VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	EXTRA VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	SIGN OF COEFFICIENT AND CONSTANT
96	MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 5	26.8	26.8	-
192	FEMALES - OTHERS & NOT STATED (OCCUPATION)	36.4	9.6	+
185	FEMALES - SALES	43.0	6.6	-
209	HOMES - TENANT S.H.A.	46.2	3.2	-
102	MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 11	48.6	2.4	+
99	MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 8	53.9	5.3	+
51	METHODISTS	56.4	2.5	-
55	PROTESTANTS (UNDEFINED)	57.9	1.5	+
115	FEMALES - NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL	60.1	2.2	+
192	DELETED	60.1	-	
98	MALES - COMPLETING SCHOOL TO GRADE 7	62.2	2.1	+
209	DELETED	61.4	-	
190	FEMALES - SERVICE WORKERS	63.8	2.4	-
189	FEMALES - CRAFTSMEN	65.1	1.3	-
47	CONGREGATIONAL	66.2	1.1	-
	CONSTANT	-	-	+
	96 x -2.8108			
	102 x +0.7201			
	99 x +0.8140			
	51 x -0.3037			
	55 x +1.0121			
	98 x +0.5198			

189 x -0.2704
190 x -1.3368
47 x -0.9738
185 x -2.0692
115 x +0.8494
+2.7305
±2.5756

Table 2.25

Labor gained significant support in 1972 from younger persons who were in the process of saving to get a deposit on a home, or who had just moved into their new homes (remember the census took place 17 months before the 1972 election and some 1971 flat dwellers would already have moved into new houses by the end of 1972).

If we disregard the religious variables, we are now only left with the long-rung volatile group - renters of S.H.A. homes - which swung against Labor in 1972, following its big swing to Labor in 1969.

* * *

In broad terms we can see then that the 1972 swing was complementary to the 1969 swing. This earlier swing was dominated by the long-run swinging voter groups, with a bias towards the older end of the 25-44 swinging voter age group, including 30-34 year old females (see figure 2.12). The 1969-72 swing complemented this swing in that it included the younger swinging voter age groups from 25-29, including the 30-34 year old males (see figure 2.21 in comparison to figure 2.12). If the reader studies the lower portions of the mean figure 2.1 and the corresponding figures 2.12 and 2.21, and performs a few vector additions of all age groups from 20 upwards, an interesting pattern of changing support for the ALP between 1966 and 1972 emerges. Firstly, the older age groups 50 and above, made no impact on the change in support for the ALP between 1966 and 1972, with an anti-Labor swing between 1966-69, being cancelled out by corresponding pro-Labor swings between 1969-72.

The 20-24 age group swung away from Labor between 1966-72, the 25-29 males were neutral, the 25-29 females swung towards Labor, 30-34 year-olds of both sexes swung towards Labor, as did the 40-44 year olds, and the 45-49 year olds. This swing and/or realignment towards Labor between 1966-72 was also

worthy of note in that sex-differences in the swing in the first election, were evened out by opposing sex-differences in the second election in 1972.

This vector addition of age-swing movements between 1966 and 1972 in fact produces a distribution of swings to the ALP between 1966-72 very similar to that predicted by the long-run mean age figure 2.1.

This finding has major implications for direction of the ALP campaign prior to 1983, which will be discussed later in the report.

* * *

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: V2 - 1969 2PP VOTE

Table 2.26

ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL
NSW			
BANKS	59.6	61.8	-2.2
BARTON	53.1	52.9	+0.2
BENNELONG	43.1	45.4	-2.3
BEROWRA	40.1	39.8	+0.3
BLAXLAND	62.7	67.1	-4.4
BRADFIELD	28.3	33.4	-5.1
CALARE	42.7	46.9	-4.2
CHIFLEY	64.8	65.6	-0.8
COOK	47.2	47.4	-0.2
COWPER	37.1	49.6	-12.5
CUNNINGHAM	65.6	65.5	+0.1
DARLING	58.8	52.2	+6.6
EDEN-MONARO	53.6	52.1	+1.5
EVANS	48.8	49.4	-0.6
FARRER	35.3	45.9	+10.6
GRAYNDLER	71.9	62.1	+9.8
GWYDER	46.6	45.8	+0.8
HUGHES	66.2	55.9	+10.3
HUME	49.1	47.3	+1.8
HUNTER	73.5	63.5	+10.0
KINGSFORD-SMITH	65.1	57.4	+7.7
LANG	61.6	59.7	+1.9
LOWE	43.5	48.7	-5.2
LYNE	38.5	50.2	-11.7
MACARTHUR	46.7	53.7	-7.0
MACKELLAR	39.2	37.5	+1.7
MACQUARIE	62.6	54.5	+8.1
MITCHELL	47.5	47.3	+0.2
NEWCASTLE	64.9	58.9	+6.0
NEW ENGLAND	40.9	42.6	-1.7
NORTH SYDNEY	37.2	39.5	-2.3
PARRAMATTA	47.3	48.4	-1.1
PATERSON	42.5	52.0	-9.5
PHILLIP	49.6	44.8	+4.8
PROSPECT	58.4	60.5	-2.1
REID	61.2	64.2	-3.0
RICHMOND	37.4	40.6	-3.2
RIVERINA	52.5	39.8	+12.7
ROBERTSON	52.2	50.3	+1.
ST. GEORGE	50.1	54.9	-4.
SHORTLAND	64.1	56.6	+7.
SYDNEY	74.0	63.2	+10.
WARRINGAH	30.3	37.6	-7.
WENTWORTH	37.9	37.6	+0.
WERRIWA	64.5	65.2	-0.
VIC			
BALACLAVA	38.8	33.0	+5.
BALLARAT	41.0	51.2	-10.
BATMAN	53.0	55.6	-2.
BENDIGO	54.5	50.6	+3.
BRUCE	41.0	40.9	+0.
BURKE	58.8	63.8	-5.
CASEY	45.0	41.5	+3.
CHISHOLM	37.8	38.2	-0.
CORANGAMITE	34.3	31.4	+2.
CORIO	54.6	60.7	-6.
DEAKIN	42.3	39.2	+3.
DIAMOND VALLEY	43.9	40.2	+3.
FLINDERS	35.5	46.5	-11.
GELLIBRAND	63.7	63.6	+0.
GIPPSLAND	30.3	33.6	-3.
HENTY	40.7	47.0	-6.
HIGGINS	31.9	34.7	-2.
HOLT	46.5	54.3	-7.
HOTHAM	41.8	46.3	-4.
INDI	32.8	39.5	-6.
ISAACS	42.0	43.6	-1.
KOOYONG	36.6	31.7	+4.
LALOR	62.0	66.9	-4.
LA TROBE	44.9	46.0	-1.
MALLEE	33.5	30.7	+2.
MARIBYRNONG	51.4	53.9	-2.
McMILLAN	44.7	42.2	+2.
MELBOURNE	59.9	70.7	-10.
MELBOURNE PORTS	56.0	57.0	-1.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: V2 - 1969 2PP VOTE

Table 2.26

ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL
MURRAY	29.1	33.4	-4.3
SCULLIN	60.0	63.3	-3.3
WANNON	38.3	34.7	+3.6
WILLS	56.2	54.6	+1.6
WIMMERA	42.0	40.1	+1.9
QLD			
BOWMAN	52.6	52.6	+0.0
BRISBANE	54.0	54.3	-0.3
CAPRICORNIA	63.8	55.2	+8.6
DARLING DOWNS	36.7	41.7	-5.0
DAWSON	64.2	55.6	+8.6
FISHER	36.8	33.2	+3.6
GRIFFITH	48.5	39.4	+9.1
HERBERT	48.3	55.9	-7.6
KENNEDY	43.4	50.2	-6.8
LEICHHARDT	63.5	55.8	+7.7
LILLEY	48.3	55.5	-7.2
McPHERSON	39.0	43.4	-4.4
MARANOA	39.8	40.0	-0.1
MORETON	46.7	49.6	-2.9
OXLEY	69.6	66.8	+2.8
PETRIE	46.1	51.2	-5.1
RYAN	43.9	46.0	-2.1
WIDE BAY	55.9	48.4	+7.5
SA			
ADELAIDE	59.8	60.5	-0.7
ANGAS	38.2	33.7	+4.5
BARKER	42.2	37.8	+4.4
BONYTHON	67.5	64.5	+3.0
BOOTHBY	41.5	39.8	+1.7
GREY	52.0	53.0	-1.0
HAWKER	58.3	53.6	+4.7
HINDMARSH	69.1	58.3	+10.8
KINGSTON	54.1	48.1	+6.0
PORT ADELAIDE	73.8	73.6	+0.2
STURT	50.7	46.8	+4.0
WAKEFIELD	38.3	37.6	+0.7
WA			
CANNING	45.2	47.5	-2.3
CURTIN	39.5	38.5	+1.0
FORREST	51.1	48.8	+2.3
FREMANTLE	64.2	57.2	+7.0
KALGOORLIE	60.1	64.6	-4.5
MOORE	44.5	48.0	-3.5
PERTH	57.2	55.2	+2.0
STIRLING	55.9	53.3	+2.6
SWAN	54.2	57.1	-2.9
TAS			
BASS	55.1	52.4	+2.7
BRADDON	64.3	56.8	+7.5
DENISON	47.5	48.9	-1.4
FRANKLIN	56.0	61.9	-5.9
WILMOT	57.8	56.3	+1.5
ACT			
CANBERRA	71.6	65.5	+6.1
FRASER	71.6	65.5	+6.1
NT			
NORTHERN TERRITORY	40.8	50.1	-9.3

ONE S.E.E. = ± 5.63

TWO S.E.E. = ± 11.26

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: V8 1969-72 SWING

Table 2.27

ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL
NSW			
BANKS	2.6	2.5	+0.1
BARTON	2.9	5.0	-2.1
BENNELONG	4.5	4.6	-0.1
BEROWRA	0.5	2.3	-1.8
BLAXLAND	4.4	4.2	+0.2
BRADFIELD	2.4	3.0	-0.6
CALARE	1.0	3.6	-2.6
CHIFLEY	7.2	2.7	+4.5
COOK	3.5	2.0	+1.5
COWPER	8.6	3.0	+5.6
CUNNINGHAM	3.7	-0.1	+3.8
DARLING	4.3	2.9	+1.4
EDEN-MONARO	-3.1	2.8	-5.9
EVANS	3.9	6.4	-2.5
FARRER	8.7	4.6	+4.1
GRAYNDLER	2.3	5.5	-3.2
GWYDER	-0.8	3.6	-4.4
HUGHES	0.6	1.3	-0.7
HUME	2.0	3.6	-1.6
HUNTER	1.6	-0.3	+1.9
KINGSFORD-SMITH	2.9	3.9	-1.0
LANG	2.6	5.3	-2.7
LOWE	3.9	4.3	-0.4
LYNE	6.6	4.2	+2.4
MACARTHUR	5.5	3.7	+1.8
MACKELLAR	6.9	2.7	+4.2
MACQUARIE	0.7	3.9	-3.2
MITCHELL	3.7	3.0	+0.7
NEWCASTLE	3.0	1.1	+1.9
NEW ENGLAND	4.4	1.8	+2.6
NORTH SYDNEY	5.5	5.2	+0.3
PARRAMATTA	2.4	3.5	-1.1
PATERSON	7.1	2.7	+4.4
PHILLIP	4.0	3.3	+0.7
PROSPECT	7.2	3.8	+3.4
REID	5.7	5.5	+0.2
RICHMOND	0.7	4.4	-3.7
RIVERINA	3.3	3.2	+0.1
ROBERTSON	6.2	6.5	-0.3
ST. GEORGE	5.0	4.5	+0.5
SHORTLAND	-1.1	-1.4	+0.3
SYDNEY	7.2	6.3	+0.9
WARRINGAH	7.7	5.3	+2.4
WENTWORTH	4.2	4.1	+0.1
WERRIWA	5.2	3.1	+2.1
VIC			
BALACLAVA	7.4	6.7	+0.7
BALLARAT	5.5	5.2	+0.3
BATMAN	3.8	4.4	-0.6
BENDIGO	-4.7	1.5	-6.2
BRUCE	6.8	5.4	+1.4
BURKE	5.8	4.1	+1.7
CASEY	7.3	7.5	-0.2
CHISHOLM	6.8	6.9	-0.1
CORANGAMITE	4.0	6.5	-2.5
CORIO	2.9	4.2	-1.3
DEAKIN	7.0	6.5	+0.5
DIAMOND VALLEY	7.7	5.9	+1.8
FLINDERS	11.6	8.7	+2.9
GELLIBRAND	1.7	4.2	-2.5
GIPPSLAND	7.5	5.5	+2.0
HENTY	9.0	6.7	+2.3
HIGGINS	7.8	5.4	+2.4
HOLT	8.7	5.9	+2.8
HOTHAM	1.1	5.5	-4.4
INDI	6.1	4.6	+1.5
ISAACS	6.9	8.1	-1.2
KOOYONG	4.4	5.9	-1.5
LALOR	3.0	3.7	-0.7
LA TROBE	10.2	8.2	+2.0
MALLEE	2.2	2.5	-0.3
MARIBYRNONG	3.1	5.4	-2.3
McMILLAN	2.9	6.0	-3.1
MELBOURNE	5.9	3.4	-2.5
MELBOURNE PORTS	6.3	7.6	-1.3

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: V8

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Table 2.27

ELECTORATE	OBSERV-ED VOTE	PRE-DICTED VOTE	RESI-DUAL
MURRAY	2.9	4.4	-1.5
SCULLIN	4.1	5.1	-1.0
WANNON	5.7	5.0	+0.7
WILLS	5.7	4.5	+1.2
WIMMERA	2.4	2.1	+0.3
QLD			
BOWMAN	3.2	1.2	+2.0
BRISBANE	-2.2	-1.6	-0.6
CAPRICORNIA	-6.0	-2.2	-3.8
DARLING DOWNS	2.0	-1.0	+3.0
DAWSON	-6.0	-2.9	-3.1
FISHER	0.2	-0.0	+0.2
GRIFFITH	1.2	1.1	+0.1
HERBERT	-2.1	-1.8	-0.3
KENNEDY	-3.9	-3.3	-0.6
LEICHHARDT	-2.2	-3.8	+1.6
LILLEY	1.8	0.6	+1.2
McPHERSON	6.3	2.2	+4.1
MARANOA	-2.2	-2.1	-0.1
MORETON	-1.2	0.3	-1.5
OXLEY	-3.3	0.4	-3.7
PETRIE	2.6	1.4	+1.2
RYAN	2.2	-0.2	+2.4
WIDE BAY	-2.9	-3.3	+0.4
SA			
ADELAIDE	-2.2	-3.3	+1.1
ANGAS	-2.2	-1.5	-0.7
BARKER	-2.0	-0.2	-1.8
BONYTHON	-3.1	-1.3	-1.8
BOOTHBY	1.3	-0.2	+1.5
GREY	6.3	-0.9	+7.2
HAWKER	0.3	0.1	+0.2
HINDMARSH	-5.8	-4.2	-1.6
KINGSTON	-1.8	0.4	-2.2
PORT ADELAIDE	-2.7	-1.9	-0.8
STURT	-3.7	-4.2	+0.5
WAKEFIELD	-3.3	-5.2	+1.9
WA			
CANNING	-1.2	-1.9	+0.7
CURTIN	-4.4	-1.8	-2.6
FORREST	-4.7	-3.7	-1.0
FREMANTLE	-6.1	-5.2	-0.9
KALGOORLIE	-0.6	1.0	-1.6
MOORE	-3.6	-2.4	-1.2
PERTH	-5.4	-6.3	+0.9
STIRLING	-8.8	-5.7	-3.1
SWAN	-2.5	-4.5	+2.0
TAS			
BASS	4.1	4.8	-0.7
BRADDON	-1.8	4.9	-6.7
DENISON	7.1	5.3	1.8
FRANKLIN	8.6	3.4	5.2
WILMOT	4.0	7.5	-3.5
ACT			
CANBERRA	-3.6	0.5	-4.1
FRASER			
NT			
NORTHERN TERRITORY			

ONE S.E.E. = ±2.58

TWO S.E.E. = ±5.16

The discussion of the residuals for the 1969 vote contained in Table 2.26 will be similar to that provided for the mean 1966-75 2PP votes.

Firstly, I list all cases derived from Table 2.26 where the absolute value of the residuals exceeded one standard error of estimate, in this case, ± 5.63 percent. These are reproduced below in Table 2.28:

Negative Residuals Less than -5.63%		Positive Residuals more than +5.63%	
Seat	Residual	Seat	Residual
Cowper	-12.5*	Darling	+ 6.6
Farrer	-10.6	Grayndler	+ 9.8
Lyne	-11.7*	Hughes	+10.3
Macarthur	- 7.0	Hunter	+10.0
Paterson	- 9.5	Kingsford-Smith	+ 7.7
Warringah	- 7.3	Macquarie	+ 8.1
Ballarat	-10.2	Newcastle	+ 6.0
Corio	- 6.1	Riverina	+12.7*
Flinders	-11.0	Shortland	+ 7.5
Henty	- 6.3	Sydney	+10.8
Holt	- 7.8	Balaclava	+ 5.8
Indi	- 6.7	Capricornia	+ 8.6
Melbourne	-10.8	Dawson	+ 8.6
Herbert	- 7.6	Griffith	+ 9.1
Kennedy	- 6.8	Leichhardt	+ 7.7
Lilley	- 7.2	Wide Bay	+ 7.5
Franklin	- 5.9	Hindmarsh	+10.8
NT	- 9.3	Kingston	+ 6.0
		Fremantle	+ 7.0
		Braddon	+ 7.5
		ACT	+ 6.1

* indicates a residual ± 2 S.E.E.s.

Table 2.28

Here we can see that 39 seats - about 30 percent of all electorates - recorded 1969 votes outside plus or minus one standard error of the predicted results. Only three seats - about two percent of the total - recorded votes outside plus or minus two standard errors. This is roughly in accordance with statistical probability.

A more detailed discussion of the geographical location of the residuals in Table 2.28 will be dealt with in the discussion of Map 2.3. However the reader can see at once the enormous diversity within the state of New South Wales, where the top three largest residuals were located, with the nation's worst two results in Cowper and Lyne, and the best result in Riverina. Table 2.29 summarises Table 2.28 by states.

State	Positive Residuals	Negative Residuals	Net Effect
NSW	10	6	+4
Vic	1	7	-6
Qld	5	3	+2
SA	2	0	+2
WA	1	0	+1
Tas	1	1	0
Ter	1	1	0
TOTAL	21	18	+3

Table 2.29

Labor benefitted in general terms by these residuals, however we shall soon see that the specific locations of these areas of overperformance and underperformance cost Labor dearly in 1969.

New South Wales generally gained from its diversity of behaviour, with ten significantly-positive residuals and only six negative residuals. Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania also made net positive contributions in general terms to the Labor vote All the net losses were returned by one state - Victoria. For the nation, the Labor Party actually outperformed the non-Labor parties in general terms to the extent of a net gain of three seats.

However, this is only part of the story. To form a Government Labor needs to perform well in marginal seats - seats close to the 50 percent mark. This certainly was not the case in net terms in 1969, when Labor generally performed well in safe Labor seats and performed badly in marginal seats. This aspect of Labor's 1969 performance is clearly shown in Table 2.30 which lists the seats with a predicted vote of more than 50.1 percent but an observed vote of less than 50.1 percent (seats Labor should have won, but didn't) and seats with an observed vote of more than 50.1 percent, but a predicted vote of less than 50.1 percent (seats Labor should not have won, but did).

In the 1969 federal elections, Labor won 59 seats to non-Labor's 66 seats, despite the fact that Labor won 50.2 percent of the 2PP vote. Table 2.30 shows that the electoral system was not to blame for Labor's failure to translate a majority of the votes into a majority of the seats: rather the fault lay with Labor's poor performances in the crucial marginal seats.

Underperformance of this type cost Labor five marginal seats in 1969. If Labor had won these five seats - or even four of them - Gough Whitlam would have been Prime Minister in October 1969. Better performances in any two states out of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland would have been enough to secure victory. Queensland in particular was a depressing result. If Queensland Labor had been able to retain Wide Bay with a sitting Labor member, and win all four seats it "should have" won, Labor would

have won the 1969 elections. Despite the fact that Labor made net general gains in Queensland in terms of large positive residuals, Tables 2.28 and 2.30 show that Queensland Labor recorded three of its worst performances in then winnable seats: Herbert, Kennedy and Lilley.

Seats Labor should have won, but didn't	STATES	Seats Labor shouldn't have won, but did
Lyne Macarthur Paterson	NSW -2	Riverina
Ballarat Holt	Vic -2	
Herbert Kennedy Lilley Petrie	Qld -3	Wide Bay
	SA +2	Kingston Sturt
	WA +1	Forrest
	Tas 0	
North. Ter.	Ter. -1	
	AUST. -5	

Table 2.30

This finding reinforces what is now hopefully generally accepted campaign theory: all possible campaign resources at all times should geographically be concentrated on winnable seats; not safe Labor or safe non-Labor seats.

It is also one of the central arguments of the current report that this general geographical principle should also be applied to attitudinal campaigns among demographic groups in Australia. It is one thing to devise policies and economic programs to cure Australia's social and political ills; it is another thing entirely to campaign intelligently among volatile demographic groups.

The above evidence already presented should also indicate to the reader that general attitudinal campaigns directed towards volatile demographic groups in all seats should be married with a campaign directed towards groups which are located disproportionately in marginal seats.

If this technique is followed between now and 1983 Labor could hope to win pro-Labor swings in all seats, the strength of which would depend on the distribution of volatile groups across all electorates.

Labor could also set out to win a re-alignment of less-volatile demographic groups which are clustered in key marginal seats.

The third component of this electoral strategy would have to include a ruthless allocation of area-specific campaign resources to marginal seats.

Through this form of three-pronged attack Labor can realistically set out to win Government in 1983 with a national 2PP vote similar to that obtained in 1969.

Table 2.31 sets out the state residuals for 1969.

State	Observed	Predicted	Residual
NSW	51.6	52.1	-0.5
Vic	44.9	48.6	-3.7
Qld	49.9	51.1	-1.2
SA	54.2	52.3	+1.9
WA	52.6	49.0	+3.6
Tas	56.1	56.7	-0.6

Table 2.31

The above table indicates the futility of contemporary state-based analyses of simple observed votes. The idea of comparing the observed state votes between states with the pre-conceived idea that they should all be about equal, makes as much sense as a similar comparison of votes between two entirely different seats in the same state. All the states are demographically and politically different. Admittedly these differences are in many respects marginal, but marginal differences in demographic composition are enough to produce significantly-different predicted results from election to election.

For example, a long-term decline in support for Labor among farmers and miners will have a similar impact on Kennedy (Qld), Darling (NSW) and Kalgoorlie (WA). However the extent to which this demographic decline produces a corresponding decline in the observed votes in the three states is largely a function of the concentration of farmers and miners in those three states. The state with the largest concentration of farmers and miners will suffer the highest loss of votes. States are therefore directly comparable to seats, except that they are larger and they are likely to produce smaller residuals through an averaging of regional exogenous factors.

In light of the above, and other evidence produced in this report, it is,quite frankly, an intellectually-destitute exercise to infer a great deal from observed state votes in isolation. The discussion here on Table 2.31 will be brief and I will analyse long-term trends in the various states at greater length in the final project of this report.

For New South Wales, the 1969 residual of -0.5 was identical to the 1966 residual. The improvement in Labor's observed vote in this state in 1969 was therefore due entirely to demographic swings and realignments common to the nation as a whole.

In Victoria, the observed 1969 vote improved over 1966 levels, but not by the amount predicted. Victoria's 1969 residual therefore declined to a level even lower than the poor 1966 result. Labor in fact was fortunate in Victoria in 1969 in that this extremely poor performance cost only two seats (see Table 2.30).

In Queensland, Labor's observed vote improved in 1969, but not by the predicted amount, a factor which cost Labor dearly in terms of winnable seats not actually won.

In South Australia, Labor improved remarkably in 1969 both in terms of the predicted and observed votes. This improvement in the S.A. residual from -1.2 in 1966 (see Table 2.22) to +1.9 in 1969 was, I believe, due almost entirely to the interaction in S.A. of state and federal politics. In S.A. in 1966, an unpopular state Labor Government was in power. In 1969, a popular state Labor Government led by Don Dunstan had lost the 1968 elections in a patently-unfair result. The resultant pro-state-Labor sympathy was translated into federal Labor votes at the 1969 elections.

In Western Australia, Labor's observed 1969 vote rose by a much greater degree than that predicted, with a corresponding rise in the residual from -1.6 to +3.6. In W.A., the state Labor Party narrowly lost the 1968 state elections, three weeks after the

loss of the State Labor Government in S.A. Again, pro-Labor state feelings, I believe, were diverted into the first major election after this state result - the 1969 federal poll.

Tasmania recorded an excellent observed vote in 1969, but the residual fell from +2.6 to -0.6. Tasmania however was the reverse of S.A. and W.A. in terms of state political events. In Tasmania in May 1969, a long-serving state Labor Government narrowly lost to the non-Labor parties. In a comment which I am afraid will become monotonous throughout this report, I can find no apparent rational state-based explanation of this idio-syncratic federal voting behaviour in Tasmania.

* * *

Table 2.27 deals with the observed, predicted and residual swings in all seats between 1969 and 1972. The individual seat figures are self-explanatory and will not be discussed here as the results of the 1969-72 swings will be dealt with in greater detail as they related to the 1972 2PP votes. These will be discussed in the next section of this project.

* * *

Map 2.3 reproduces the residuals from table 2.26 in map form, with the high positive residuals shown by darker shading.

The map can be summarised as follows:

New South Wales: Labor performed well in the country Labor seats of Riverina and Darling, and quite badly in most other country seats. Personal votes obtained by Labor and non-Labor sitting members would I think explain most of this variation. Labor performed extremely well in all seats based on Newcastle. On the outskirts of Sydney, Macquarie and Hughes were excellent results, as were the results in the inner-city cluster of seats based on Sydney, Grayndler and Kingsford-Smith. Performances in the northern and inner-western suburbs were poor.



Map 2.3
V2 - 1969 2PP
- residuals

Victoria: Most of the country seats returned poor results, again reflecting the personal votes of non-Labor sitting members. In Melbourne, poor results were returned in the inner-city, the western suburbs and the eastern suburbs in Henty and Holt. Excellent results were recorded in the outer-northern marginals of Diamond Valley and Casey.

Queensland: There was a great deal of diversity in the Queensland result, reflecting an apparent lack of uniformity of impact of the 1969 campaign. Most of the provincial city seats were excellent, some however were extremely bad. Personal votes obviously played a big role here. In Brisbane itself, a high positive residual was returned in the old inner-city non-Labor seat of Griffith. Oxley was a good result, while the performance of Labor candidates in the northern suburbs seats of Petrie and Lilley were bad for Labor. Both of these two latter seats should have been won by Labor.

South Australia: This state produced an extremely attractive map for 1969, due to the generally-high residual for the state as a whole. Excellent results however were recorded in the western/beachside seats of Hindmarsh and Kingston.

Western Australia: Results in the country seats were relatively lack-lustre, as was the result in Swan. Perth's northern suburbs and the southern industrial area of Fremantle produced favourable results.

Tasmania: The northern portion of the state provided more favourable results for Labor candidates than the southern seat of Franklin.

Summary: Outside the cities, Labor candidates performed either extremely well (mainly in Labor-held seats) or extremely badly. In the cities, the older/inner city/industrial/waterfront seats generally provided high positive residuals, as did some seats in

the outer suburbs. Results in the intervening suburbs were generally mediocre.

* * *

Tasmania: Performances in all Tasmanian seats in 1972 were either good or very good (in the case of Braddon).